Lloyd F. Webster and Carl A. Webster v. John J. Knop et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Lloyd F. Webster and Carl A. Webster v. John J.
Knop et al : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Adams, Peterson & Anderson; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Webster v. Knop, No. 8577 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2691
Case No. 8577 · 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
:tLOYD P~ WEBSTER and CARL 
.~A.<WEBSTER, 
__ ' ,.. ··!·\'", • 
· "Plaintiffs· and Respondents, 
.~. 
-vs.---. 
J.OHN J. KNOP, ·WYCOTAH OIL 
'& ·. URANIUM CO~, a Corporation, 
DOUGLAS J. DAVIS, GRANT 
SJ(UMWAY, JOHN DOE, RICH-
ARD .ROE, .FIRST ROE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
r 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
ADAMS, PETERSON ~ ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
.Monticello, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINTS ---------------------------------- 3 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 
1. Answer to Appellants' Points No. 1 and No. 2____________ 3 
2. Answer to Appellants' Points No. 3 and No. 4 ____________ 19 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
AUTHORITIES ·CITED 
Ballard v. Golob, Colorado, 83 P.ac. 376·--------------------------------------- 4 
Bradley v. Andrews, 91 Colorado 378, 14 P. 2d 1086 ________________ 17 
Cadle v. Helfrich, 36 Ariz. 390, 286 Pac. 186____________________________ 4 
Clark v. Mitchell, Nevada, 130 Pac. 760 .. ---------------------------------- 5 
Craw v. Wilson, 22 Nev. 385, 40 Pac. 1076 ________________________________ 17 
Hendrickson v. California Talc Company, California, 130 
p 2d 807 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------8,20 
Hodgson v. Federal Oil & Development ·Co., 27 4 U.S. 15________ 18 
Hollingisworth v. Tufts, Colorado, 162 Pac. 155________________________ 17 
Hunt v. Patchin, 35 Fed. 816---------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Jennings v. Rickard, Colorado, 15 Pac. 677 .... ---------------------------- 17 
\ 
King v. Hintze, 2 Utah 2d 166, 270 P 2d 1095---------------------------- 14 
Kline v. Wright, 42 F. 2d 927·--------------·---------------------------------------- 4 
Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., Utah No. 8439 ________________________ 21 
Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92, 84 P. 2d 30L .. 17 
Page v. Summers, 70 Cal. 121, 12 Pac. 120____________________________ 17 
Soule v. Johnson, Idaho, 201 Pac. 834____________________________________________ 4 
Speed v. McCarthy, South Dakota, 77 N.W. 590 (affirmed, 
181 U.S. 269) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Stephens v. Golob, Colorado, 83 Pac. 381. ___________________________________ 20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
( 0 ontinued) 
Page 
Stevens v. Grand Central Mining Co., 133 Fed. 28 ________________ 3,4,21 
Turner v. Sawyer, 150 U.S. 578 ______________________________________________________ 3,4 
Yarwood v. Johnson, Washington, 70 Pac. 123 ________________________ 4 
TEXTS CITED 
40 Corpus Juris, Mines, Pages 1154, 1155 ____________________________________ 19 
3 Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) 858.----------------------------------------------- 19 
5 Utah Law Review, Page 35 .... ---------------------------------------------------- 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD P. \VEBSTER and CARL 
A. WEBST.ER, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
J"OI-IN J. KNOP, WYCOTAH OIL Case No. 8577 
& URANIUM CO., a Corporation, 
DOUGLAS J. DAVIS, GRANT 
SHUMWAY, JOHN DOE, RICH-
ARD ROE, FIRST ROE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents in this case are Lloyd P. Webster 
and Carl A. Webster, who will be referred to as Plain-
tiffs and Respondents; and Appellants Douglas J. Davis 
and Grant Shumway will be referred to as Appellants. 
Other parties to the action who are no longer before this 
Court will be referred to by name. 
Respondents do not controvert appellants' statement 
of facts as being inconsistent but contend that their 
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statement is incomplete and that the following facts also 
appear from the reeord: 
( 
That the location of the Faith Cl_a_i_gl~ ~n._~p~ 15, 
1954, in the name of plaintiffs a~ the defendant, .John 
, J. KnoJ?_, menti<:>:~ted on Page 5 of appellants' brief, was 
~ade by the _ _Qlaintiffs pursuant to the Grubstake Agree-
1 !!l~P.!d~-~l_for'ih __ in full on Pages 3 to 5 of appellantS: 
brief._(Pre-trial Order of the Trial Court, R. 45) 
That the copies of the K otices of Location recorded 
on April 24, 1954, and the copies of the amended Notices 
of Location recorded on _.._-1._ugust 12, 1954, referred to on 
Page 5 of appellants' brief, named the plaintiffs and 
the defendant Knop as the locator.s of the Faith claims. 
(Abstract of title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2) 
That the appellant, Grant Shumway testified that on 
examination of the records pertaining to the Faith claims 
in the Recorder·s Office of San Juan County, State of 
Ptah, _]w and the appellant, Douglas J. Davis, _found the 
~G~rd~cl copies of the X otices of_Lo~till!!_!eCQ_r_<:!~d on 
April :2-l-, 195±, and the Aluended X otices of Location re: 
, corded on .. August 13, 1954, whiclLnam~e ~i!l~ 
/ a~~ the_ defe~)dant J~n()p_~s the locators ?f the Faith 
\ d.u!ns~_ (Tr. 1 ... ) 
That appellant Douglas J. Davis testified that when 
ht' Pxamined the records of the Hecorder's Office of San 
,Jnan County, t Ttah, in nfonticello, rtah, he discovered 
ti1P eo piP~ of the Not iees of Location recorded April 2±, 
t 9;)-l-, and the _.\lnended Notices of Location recorded 
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August 12, 1954, which named the plaintiffs and the 
defendant Knop as the locators of the Faith claims. (Tr. 
33) 
rrhat prior to the execution of the quit claim deed 
of the Faith claims from defendant Knop to the appel-
lants Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway, on July 
26, 1955, as shown on Page 6 of appellants' brief, the 
appellants Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway m_a_de_ \ 
no effort to contact the plaintiffs to inquire as to whether_ ' 
they claim~d a~y interest in the Faith claims. ( Tr. 24, _/ 
25, 52) 
That the Notices of Location recorded by the de-
fendant Knop on August 27, 1954, used exactly the same 
description and covered exactly the same ground .as the 
Amended Notices of Location recorded on August 10, 
1954. (Abstract of title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2) 
ARGU:WIENT 
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINTS NOS. 1 AND 
2, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THE DEFENDANT, JOHN J. KNOP, HELD THE TITLE TO 
THE FAITH ·CLAIMS ACQUIRED BY THE LOCATION OF 
AUGUST 14, 1954, IN TRUST FOR THE PLAINTIFFS TO 
THE EXTENT OF AN UNDIVIDED TWO-THIRDS INTER-
EST. 
It 1s well established that a co-owner of an un-
patented mining claim who secures a patent to the ex-
clusion of his co-owner, holds the title acquired thereby 
in trust for his co-owner. Turner v. S.awyer, 150 U.S. 
578; Stevens v. Grand Central ~!fining Co., 133 F,ed. 28. 
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The cases unanimously hold that a co-owner or co-
tenant in an unpatented mining claim, who relocates the 
claim in his own name alone after the lapse of the .annual 
assessment work, holds the title acquired by reason of the 
relocation in trust for his co-tenant. Hunt v. Patchin, 
35 Fed. 816; !{line v. Wright, 42 F. 2d 927; Yarwood 
v. Johnson, \Y ashington, 70 Pac. 123; Ballard v. Golob, 
Colorado, 83 Pac. 376; Soule v. Johnson, Idaho, 201 Pac. 
~:3-±: Cadle v. Helfrich, 36 Ariz. 390, 286 P.ac. 186. 
These cases are merely specific applications of the 
general rule that "co-tenants stand in a certain relation 
to each other of 1nutual trust and confidence; that neither 
will be permitted to act in hostility to the other in refer-
ence to the joint estate; and that the distinct title ae-
quired by one will inure to the benefit of all ... " (Tur-
ner v. Sawyer, supra) and further that "a co-owner who 
an1ends the location notice, relocates the claim, or pro-
cures the issuance of a patent in his own name, will not 
be pennitted to thus exclude the other owners and ap-
propriate the clainl to hinlself. but wnl be declared to hold 
the right or title thereby acquired in trust for all." 
(Stevens Y. Grand Central :J[ining Co., supra.) (Italics 
added) 
In the ease at hand the eYidence shows a location 
h~· the plaintiffs and the defendant J olm J. l{nop and a 
snhst>qlwnt relocation in his own nrune by the said Knop. 
ThP Appellants argue that the general rule above stated 
should not hP applied to this ease because it is distin-
guishable frmu the eases allOYl~ cited, on the ground that 
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in this case the original locations by the plaintiffs and the 
defendant John J. I\::nop, pursuant to the Grub Stake 
Agreement, were invalid at the outset. Respondents con-
cede that the locations of April 15, 1954, were ~oj_d_ ~s _ 
between the locators and the government al_!_g_illso. _alLt9 
iliirdpaf11es-acqulringrighls--in--~d.:_~espo~~~~!~ __ _ 
UeiiyfllaT111eTocatwns we_~ __ vo~~}or_~'qJlRJf'!.PQ.s_es'' and 
contend thaTas-bet\\~een the parties to the location, a 
fiduciary relationship of co-tenancy came into existence. 
The principle that the relationship of co-tenancy, in (( 
equity, between co-locators, arises upon the location of I i 
an unpatented mining clairn, even though invalid as : 
against third parties .and the government, is clearly illus-, 
trated in the following cases : 
ln Clark v. lv!itchell, Nevada, 130 Pac. 760, the de-
fendant agreed with the owners to do the as.sess1nent 
work on the Siver King Fraction claim for a one-fourth 
interest in that clairn. The defendant failed to do the 
assessment work agreed upon and relocated Whirlwind 
No. 4 claim in his own nan1e over the ground covered by 
the Silver King Fraction. The owners of the latter 
claim brought a suit to impose a trust in their favor for 
a three-quarters interest in the vVhirlwind No. 4 claim. 
The defendant contended that the Silver King Fraction 
was not valid because it was .separated into two parcels 
by a prior valid claim and consequently there was no 
I[ trust relationship because the claim was invalid in its 
inception. The court, in rejecting the defendant's con-
,c tention and imposing the trust, said: 
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"As under the agreement, Mitchell (defend-
ant) was a trusted agent or representative of 
Clark (plaintiff), for the doing of the work on 
the . Silv:er ~ing Fraction and for relocating the 
WhirlWind No. 4 and ~Iitchell was in duty bound 
to protect Clark to the extent of the interests 
agreed upon in the Silver King Fraction and in 
the relocatio_n of the Whirlwind No. 4, Mitchell 
as a tenant 'ln common, was estopped from deny-
J ing the rights of Clark in the claim, as recognized 
by their agreement. V\7fiether the relocation made 
by Mitchell contains more or less ground, and 
whether the Silver King Fraction may hold a 
piece of land segregated from its location point, 
are not questions properly in issue in these cases. 
These parties being .. in e(_luit~ants in common.J-
whatever rights .1.l! itchell acquired by location or 
by possession, or otherwise, in the ground, u·ould 
inure to the benefit of Clark to the extent of the 
undivided interest to zclz iclz he is entitled. Whether 
one or more of the locations are valid or subse-
quent to others is not material. The undirided 
interest of Clark and J.l!itclzell stand on a common 
basis, difierently than if a stranger were seeking 
to recoL:er the land ou the claim that their location 
was roid a11d tlzat he lzad made the first ralid 
one." (Italics added) 
In SJJccd r. JJcCarfh,ll. South Dakota, 77 N."\Y. 590 
( affinned, 1~1 l r.s. ~tl9). tl1e plaintiff purchased an in-
tPre~t of one of the locators of the 1nining clain1s located 
h~, the defendants. The defendants reloe.ated tne claim 
aftPr no annual assessment work was done. Defendants 
~ought to defend .an aetion hy the plaintiff to ilnpose a 
trust on the grounds that the original elailns were in-
valid lH'('an~c thPrP was no dis('OYery and consequently 
~···-
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there was no cotenancy and no fiduciary duty ~ecause 
;;-right~ c~~e i~1to exi~te~ce as .a result-;£ the location. 
The court rejected this contention, l!Qldtng that it con- f/{7/?,. 
sidered the clain1s valid as between the parties to the lo~ ~ 
cation and defendants would not be permitted to deny /4: 
---------------------------........___----- ·--. 
that their locations were valid. Based upon this .assump-
-------- ---------------- -------" - ---- -tion, the court applied the general rule, using the follow-
ing language : 
"The relocator is permitted by the statute 
(requiring annual assessn1ent work) to acquire 
the property in the s.ame manner that the original 
locator would have acquired it, but because of his 
relation to another who may be a co-tenant, a 
p1ortgag~e, or person having no ~~state ~in the ~ 
~erty~ wilU>_e__adj@g_ed_Jo_hold ±he title in_ 
~~t !or such person. J~l cases of th,is cltar-\ 
acle_r thf;_Jrust depends upon the relatio'J'l, of the ) 
parties at?Jd not upon the 'manner in which title 
__!!~acquired.'' (Italics added). 
Appellants seek to avoid the imposition of the rule 
applied in these latter two cases by drawing an even 
finer distinclion, that is, "'that. the~ inyalis].ity _of tbe rru:r-
ported original location is not based upon minor te~hnical 
~-- \..._-.---- "---" '----- "'--- ~ - . - -- -----
defeG_t, e.g., improper monuments or l
but is based ~ohce-ded-inability to place any min-
--------· .... . . -- ~ ~ 
i_ng chtill1 whatsomz:.er. upo-n-the- prope_r~tl:." It is worthy 
of note that Appellants assert no basis, which bears a 
relation to the reasons announced in the cases for apply-
ing the trust rule, for n1aking the distinctions sought 
to be made, that is, between cases where the claim be-
comes invalid because of failure to perform the annual 
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assessment work; cases where the claim is invalid from 
the beginning because of lack of discovery or because the 
claim is divided by a prior valid claim; and the present 
case where the claims are invalid because the land on 
which they were located was withdrawn by a pre-existing 
oil and gas lease. The trust arises out of th rel tionshi 
of the parties and does not end on the technical es 
f£?--~~!:_J?.ing the validity of unpatented mining claims as 
~~~and third parties or the government. 
H endrick.'jon r. California Talc Co'mpany, California, 
130 P. 2d 806, presents a situation in which the mining 
claims "\vere originally located on withdrawn land and 
effectively answers .Appellants~ contention that the dis-
tinctions above mentioned should be made. The facts of 
that ease are stated as follows by the court: 
"On June 7, 1930, appellant. ~-\man and re-
spondent, Osear L. Hoerner, Scott and Farnum 
were on the ~IojaYe Desert on business connected 
with another clain1 whieh is not here involved. 
Noticing the white hill to the northwest. they 
went over. discovered a deposit of bentonite clay 
and located a c.lain1 Co-operation X o. 1. Desiring 
to take in 1~0 aeres. theY included as eo-locators 
the nrunes of appellant, Hendrieksen and respond-
('nt, Hateliffe. They deseribed and n1arked on the 
ground a parcel of land smne 8,500 feet long and 
600 feet "·ide ru1d erected a diseoYerY 1nonmnent 
and boundary ntonuments. * * * X~ contention 
i:.; 1nade that· all requirements for 1naking such a 
loea.tion w0r0 not nwt .and ohseiTed. On the same 
da,·, thPY infonned IIendrieksen that he had been 
iiH:lndP(l as one of the locators of this claiin and 
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inclusion. * * * e . 
"It appears, however, that the land covered ft f.'. 
by the Co-o~ration No. 1 claim was included inJ!_Z ljr;J./.P" 
larg_g_ tract o!._ la_nd whiCh was temporanly with- · ~ 
drawn from public entry_p~pdi_~g the fixi~g QJJ! 
definite location of the line of an aqueduct to _p~ ~. . t•YJ 
oonstnwt.cillD_x_ihe purpose of bq~water_s_. ~ 
from Boulder Dam into this state_, wb.ich_ with.~ n. O,.b 
drawal order had ~de on June-4, ~~3g,_t~ree #. p.w 
days before that clann was located. Tliis rand was 
-rrot·-resforect to pulJhc entry until August 6, 1931. 
The fact that this land had been withdrawn from 
entry was unknown to any of these parties on 
June 7, 1930, ,and was unknown to the appellants 
until after the land was located by certain of the 
respondents. That fact was learned by Oscar L. 
Hoerner and by Scott, Ratcliffe and Farnum 
shortly after the attempted location of Co-opera-
tion No. 1 claim, ~(i4~~~I>-~rties il!_f_Q_rl_!_l-
ed their associates Hendricks_e_n__or Aman_ of this 
fact. *** Tf11-I>ec~~b~~ 15, 1931, and aftei- the 
laii.d had been restored to entry, the respondent, 
Oscar L. Hoerner located Company claims No. 1, 
No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4, respectively, including as 
co-locators, his wife, his brother, and five of the 
other respon~_ents. A few days later, the other 
five conveyed their interest to the Hoerners and 
still later the IIoerners entered into an agreement 
with the California Talc Company which was 
thereafter assigned to the National Lead Com-
pany. -11?-e court found that each of these corpor_:0 
ate res ondents entered into these a reements 
ith notice that the appellants each clairne an 
undivided one-sixth Interest ui and to that p.art 
of the land whiCh had been Inclu<;Ied Ill tbe (~a: 
operation No. 1 claim. ***" 
The court sajd, after reciting the above facts: 
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"T~e controlling question is, whether, under 
these cncum.stances, the respondent, Oscar L. 
~oerner had the right to relocate this land for 
his own benefit, after it was restored to entry and 
whether he thereby secured a valid location as to 
that part of the land included in the former Co-
op~ration No. 1 claim free from any equitable 
claims on the part of the appellants. The gist of 
the respo!li!~!!ts'_ contention_ is that tile ongmal f0Ca~!9n _]~~il!g void, any of the- origrnal locators 
had ~- legal right, after the lands were restored 
to _ep.!ry, t<? un1fe ~!h~otQ.er _l_o~atQrs-in ig~fug_ 
llie _!lew~ and v~l!Q location free from any duty or 
responsibilitY to other appellants, who were their 
~~-~oCTates-m:--tne-orfgill.aT atfemptealoe::J.gQil. *** 
"There is no question that the attempted loca-
tion of this claim on June 7, 1930, \Yas void as 
between the locators and the government and 
that the same would be void as to third parties 
who acquired rights in the land. *'u' 
"'The situation here presented is one where 
the_gQyeiillllen t is~plaining, _where no third 
party is involved, W:.ll~~- of the~ 
·---r-ors d.iscoyered t'Ih'lt the n1ethoo-by whic1i 11iey 
were proceeaing was defectiYe --because--me-Ta.Iid 
haa Been retnporaril~- "ithdra'm fr~d 
\\·hirh faet \,-as unlmowh to the others, and where 
this lHlrt~- without informing the others concern-
ing the situation atteinpted to relocate or, as lie 
~ay8 ~to loeate' the clailn for his own benefit_ 
I "'Vith respeet to the inYalidity of mining ela im8 and the right8 of co-locators, the courts 
hnn' long- recognized that .a different situation 
may prevail as between the co-locators then1selYes 
and that whieh g·oyern as between the locator and 
the govennnent or a third party. 
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"In Speed v. :McCarthy, 181 U.S. 269, 21 S. Ct. 
613, 616, 45 L. Ed. 855, the court said: 
'The court held that the relation of co-
tenant existed between lHcCarthy and Frank-
lin when Franklin located the Holy Terror 
and l{eystone claims; that original locators 
may resume work at any time before reloca-
tion; that Franklin's acts of relocation did 
not terminate the fiduciary relocation be-
tween himself and :McCarthy; and said : "We 
think the circuit court should have adjudged 
the defendants to be trustees, and have en-
forced the trust." This conclusion is not pre-
cluded by the language of the Federal stat-
utes. They provide that upon failure to com-
ply with required conditions as to labor or 
improvements the claim or mine upon which 
such failure occurred shall be open to loca-
tion in the same manner as if no location of 
the s.ame had ever been made. Rev. Stat. US 
2324 (30 USCA (28) ). It is contended that 
if Congres.s intended to have the relocator 
regarded as a trustee, such intention would 
have been expressed in the statute. The con-
tention is not tenable. The trust results from 
the fiduciary relation of the parties and not 
from the operation of the statute.' 
wl1he respondents .argue that the trustee prin-
ciple there applied has no application here since 
in that case the original entry was valid while 
here it was invalid. No cases are cited where such 
a distinction is drawn .and since the trust arises . 
E~ t~e __ r~l~~ion of the partie~, it s.hould no 
more Ee defeate<:t-by~-a temporary withdrawal 
oruerflian by a failure to eompl;,' with the statute 
originaiTf -giv1nga-righf of entry~ In fad, the--
former-situation results from ignorance and jnad-
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vertance, while the latter involves a more positive 
disregard of the law. No good reason appears 
for drawing such a distinction or applying a dif-
ferent rule in such a case as this. If such a rule 
applies to a subsequent failure to comply with the 
law where the original location was valid the 
f ' • reasons or the rule would seem to apply with 
even greater force where the locators have asso-
ciated themselves together for the particular pur-
pose of obtaining title to a particular claim, where 
they have complied with all of the requirements 
of the law in that regard, where their efforts are 
ineffective for the tin1e being because of the tem-
porary withdrawal of the land from the entry, 
and where one of the associates discovers the 
~neentry antl "ithout infOr:h::iiilg The 
others J2!0ceeds_ tg locate ~the Jand for I1imself' 
-when-_ the right _ _QLe__!lt~ _i~_l"e§tored. The usual 
! I rules_ that .a Jic1u_cg.,rv relationship exists between 
tenants in common and that one co-tenant_ma_Y--llOt 
gain a --:P_re~~rifad,anJ~ii ~--_acting_ady_erseiy..to 
Ii!s fellow tenants should be .applied _tg ___ such a. 
j case. If it may be said_ that~ -stricti}-_ ~aking1 
!.t j these parties were not co-tenants since a complete_ 
II ~;\~~ \1!u1~~~~~,~~: a~:Ir!d~ r~·~'a~t~~i::~~j~t the court said in Speed~,. :JicCarthy. supra,~ 
trust results fr01n the fiduciarv rela~ 
"'pa 1:f10sarufnor-:fi=Oili'-~~t t~ 
t0elm ieal1Y lw said tol)e CO-tenants. • •• 
. --------- - - --
'' 'r 0 find nothing in the cases relied upon by 
the respondents which support their contention 
that the fart that this land had been withdra,Jv"ll 
frmn f'nh·~· is controlling and all equitable rules 
and principles an~ inapplicable heeanse the at-
ten1pted location was void in ]a"· and in fact. 
There is no distinction in this regard between a 
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mining enterprise and other enterprises for which 
men associate themselves with an expres.s or im-
plied .agreement to work together for their com-
mon good and to a desired end. Equitable rules 
have frequently been applied in controversies over 
mining claims. Speed v. 11cCarthy, supra, is an 
example of such cases. 
"The general rule is that parties engaged in 
a c.omnwn enterprise owe a duty to e~ach other 
with respect to all n1atters in connection there-
with, that a trust relationship is inherent in such 
an association for a cmnmon purpose, and that 
one of the parties will not be allowed to deal with 
the subject Inatter of the association for his own 
advantage. In 1funson v. Fishburn, 183 Cal. 206, 
19 P 808, 810, the court said, 'It is well settled that 
the associates in a common enterprise, under 
whatever guise, have a duty to each other to make 
full disclosure of any preference or profit not 
common to all of the associates.' These_gen_eral 
..._principles are applicab_le here~I!_Q_ tb.~ __ argument. 
that the Hoerner location in December, 1931, w~s 
not a 'reloca tion'.slnce-·tliereluia Iieen no )~g_al lQ:_ 
· cation theretofore,-tnaf-the parties were not co.: 
tenants aprlJhat some. ()f the elements of a par:t-
ners111l:!_as be.tween these parties were lacking, are 
be~ide the point_ 
"These parties entered into a joint enter-
prise, having for its object the obtaining of title 
to this particular land as a mining claim and the 
resulting fiduciary relationship between the par-
ties could not thus lightly be ignored. *** The fact 
that the original attempted location was invalid, 
the land not being open to entry, is not the con-
clusive or determining factor. When the with-
drawal order was vacated, and the land was re-
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and the original locators, having otherwise com-
plied with the law, were free to make a valid lo-
cation. Having found out the facts which were 
unknown to the appellants, Hoerner made such 
location without including the appellants as par-
ties thereto, b t in so doin h w r t 
act for himself a one Since he occ111ied__a~ 
ciary: po~on,. the equitable rules apply a~d his _____ 
act-In relocating the land under such mrcum- _ 
~ces iiiustye-llelato--rn:ure-to tlie oener1t of the 
appellarlfS, for whom he was a trustee.." 
The court then ordered that judgment be entered 
in favor of the appellant with respect to a one-sixth in-
terest in the part of the land which was found to be within 
the limits of the original claim as atten1pted to be located 
on June 7, 1930, as against the reloc.ators and their trans-
ferees with notice. 
Clearly, all the elen1ents which established the trust 
in the above case are present in the case at bar. In both 
cases we find a ~tion by plaintif~~~nd defendants of__a 
mining claim on_lan_d_withd.r~'vn fr_QI!l entry .an___d__a__subs~.J 
quent location by the defendants~_to__fu__e __ exclusion_Qf the 
pl~i~tiffs, after the in1pedi1nent_t?}o~~ion_ wa~_!'_emQ!~~~ 
In J(iuq v. Hi11tze, 2 Ftah 2d 166, 270 P 2d 1095, the 
plaintiff made n1ining locations in Nevada which were 
not valid because of the failure to sink the required 
discovery shaft in accordance with N eYada law. Plaintiff 
contracted to convey his interest in the property to the 
defendant who agreed to form a company and give stock 
to the plaintiff. When the defendant visited the claiins 
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and recognized that they were invalid, he relocated them 
in his own name. Defendant then failed to perform his 
obligation under the agree1nent. Plaintiff brought an ac-
tion to recover on the contract. As a defense, defendant 
.asserted that "'the inability of respondent (plaintiff) *** 
to convey to appellant sorne .substantial right or interest 
in and ·to said unpatented claims constituted a breach of 
the promotion contract of such nature as to defeat its 
purpose and relieve .and discharge the defendant from 
the duty of organizing the corporation contemplated by 
the promotion agreeinent.'' The Court affirmed judg-
ment for the plaintiff, and held that the defendant in re.....e-.: :/., 
locating the clairns in his own name, waived ,any defect e-~ 
in the prior filing. _vVhile the_ Court did not expressly 
base its decision,..-~n the trust theory, it- is evident that it 
defermjpJ~d that .the_ relationship of pl:Mntifi_a,_n~ _clefegg~ 
-ant was such that the relocation by the defendant inured 
totliebenefit -ofphiintiff. (See Vol.-~ Utah Law Review, ~ 
-page-35-f~- - - -- --. ·-· --- ---
It is obvious from the foregoing, that, contrary to 
the statement found on Pages 18 and 19 of Appellants' 
Brief, this is .a case "where co-tenants of real property 
enter into a relationship of trust, one to the other, so 
as to preclude one co-tenant from gaining some advan-
tage with respect to the joint property over his co-
tenant," and " where joint tenants are acting in hostility 
to the joint estate;" .and "where one of several joint 
owners of mining claims has sought to ... relocate the 
c!aims for his own benefit.>' (Italics added.) 
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Appellants contend that inasmuch as the Grubstake 
Agreement expired by its own terms prior to the re-
location by the defendant Knop on August 14, 1954, 
Knop was free to relocate the Faith claims in his own 
nmne to the exclusion of plaintiffs. The cases we have 
cited hold that the trust relationship arises out of the 
originalloc~tiQn of the_claims~_:rl_ihQJJKh -~l!Q~_e_q_11ently 
-ro-und to-b~ invalid, .and this relati~!:l_s_}J.ip is notrlepend-
ant u~_!l--~!lY agreemen.fto-;-elocate the claims if and 
whe!_l_it_b_e~Q.:m_e_~ll-Q~sible to validate them. Thei'_e_ is no 
evidence __ ~hat the trust _!~l~ti~~~~~:EJ?~-~'Yeen th~ _pa_rtigs 
_!!_l _ _thif?_ ~l:!cs_g __ }'~as_ ~yer ~rmin-Jtt~d. In fact, the contrary-
appears from the fact that Amended Notices of Location, 
giving the survey description [the claims were surveyed 
during July, 1954, (Defendants' Exhibit 2)] and naming 
the plaintiffs and the defendant Knop .as the locators, 
were posted on Faith No. 2 to X o. 10, inclusive, on 
August 10, 1954, and copies of said notices were re-
corded on August 12, 1954, all after the expiration date 
of the Grubstake .. A .. green1ent and the latter date only 
two days prior to the relocation by Knop in his own 
name on August 14, 1954. (Pre-Trial Order of Trial 
Court R. 45; Abstract of Title, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2). 
Furthermore, the Grubstake Agreen1ent ren1ains in ef-
fect for purposes of detern1ining the rights and interests 
of the parties as to all clailns located pursuant to its 
terms. The Agree1nent conten1plated the situation which 
occurred in this case, that is, that the clailns located 
thereunder Inight be subject to a pre-existing lease is-
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sued under the l\Iineral Leasing Act of 1920 which would 
necessitate validation of the claims at a later date, for 
it provides as follows: 
"3. It is furthennore specifically under-
stood and agreed that the First Party shall ad-
vance all of the costs of filing the aforesaid 
claims whether filing as mineral claims or lease 
tracts under the Atomic Energy Commission Reg-
ulation Circular 7." 
At the time the defendant Knop validated the Faith 
claims, Public Law 585 of the 83rd Congress superseded 
Circular 7 as the means by which such claims were 
validated. 
Appellants cite cases from courts in this country 
in which the parties to the prospecting agreement mu-
tually abandoned the agreement and the claims located 
thereunder, (:Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App 
2d 92, 84 P. 2d 301; Page v. Su1nmers, 70 Cal. 121, 12 Pac. 
120), cases in which there was no location of the mining 
rlaims in question during the term of the agreement 
(Jennings v. Rickard, Colorado, 15 Pac. 677), cases in 
which the plaintiff contributed nothing to the discovery 
of the mining claims or the same were not acquired 
with partnership capital (Hollingsworth v. Tufts, Colo-
rado~ 162 Pac. 155; Craw v. \Vilson, 22 Nev. 385, 40 Pac. 
1076), cases which do not involve the location of un-
patented mining claims at all (Bradley v. Andrews, 91 
Colo. 378, 1-± P 2d 1086), and cases in which the right 
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of the plaintiff had been extinguished by adverse pos-
session. (Hodgson v. Federal Oil & Development Co., 
274 u.s. 15). 
There is no contention nor evidence in the present 
case that the plaintiffs abandoned or lost their rights 
through adverse possession. The Faith claims were dis-
covered and located during the term of the Grubstake 
Agreernent, through the skill and effort of the plaintiffs. 
The relocations by the defendant Knop on August 1-1, 
1954, used the same discovery and corner monuments 
and contained the identical names and descriptions 
found in the Amended Notices of Location recorded on 
July 5, 1954 (Tr. 4, 5; Abstract of Title, plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 2). All Knop did in relocating the claii11s was 
to place a new location notice thereon and record a copy 
of the same. The contention that the plaintiffs con-
tributed nothing to the location of the Faith clain1s and 
that there was no consideration to support the Grub-
stake Agreement is sufficiently answered by the follow-
ing quotation from the JHe1norandmn Decision written 
by the I-Ionorable F. \Y. l{eller, Trial Judge in this case, 
towit: 
"Under the location of the Faith Group as 
made by the plaintiffs, the parties could not 
assert and perfect title through patent proceed-
ings or even a Yalid possessory right, nor could 
they assert a Yalid possessory right against other 
claimants locating the area after it becmne open 
to loe.ation. It cannot on that account he Inain-
tained that the defendant K nop got nothing for 
the considerations advanced by him in his con-
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tract with the plaintiffs in the location of the 
Faith Group. Knop, in making the location after 
the area of the Faith Group w.as open to location 
had made use of the knowledge obtained by him 
through the efforts of the plaintiffs and their 
skill as miners in choosing and staking the area 
for the first location; he made use of the monu-
ments erected by the plaintiffs for the first 
location to make the point of discovery and the 
exterior boundaries. There is justice in a rule 
which prevents his excluding the plaintiffs from 
an interest in the claims. The plaintiffs and the 
defendai!_t Knop stood in a relatio1!§_4i!>_of mutual 
trust and confidence, .and the title acquired lJy 
_Kitop- in:ured-fo- -tli_e __ benerit of hfmself and the 
plaintiffs." (lVIemor-andum Decision, R. 46.) 
Thus it is apparent that the citations found in Ap-
pellants' Brief from 3 Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) § 858 
and 40 Corpus ,Juris, J\Enes, Pages 1154 and 1155 and 
the cases frmn foreign jurisdiction cited in the footnotes; 
are not in point because the Faith claims were acquired 
pursuant to the Grubstake Agreement by the plaintiffs 
(Pre-Trial Order of the Trial Cour~t, R. 45). 
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINTS NOS. 3 AND 
4, APPELLANTS WERE NOT BON A FIDE PURCHASERS 
FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE AND THEY TqOK 'THE 
FAITH CLAIMS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHTS OF RESPOND-
ENTS. 
rrhe testimony of the Appellants shows that prior 
to the purchase of the Faith claims from the defendant 
Knop, the Appellants had actual notice of the following 
facts: 
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1. That plaintiffs and the defendant Knop located 
the Faith claiins on .1\ pril15, 1954, pursuant to the Grub-
stake Agreement and amended the location of the same 
on July 5, 1954, and on August 10, 1954. ( Tr. 20, 21, 45, 
46; Appellants' Brief pp 8-9). 
2. The pre-existing relationship of the plaintiffs 
and the defendant Knop. (Appellants' Brief, pp 9-10). 
The Appellants made no effort to contact the plain-
tiffs to inquire of their claim to the property in question 
because they were .advised and had concluded that the 
plaintiffs had no interest because the location made in 
their name and that of the defendant Knop was void. 
(Tr. 24, 25, 52). 
Thus Appellants knew every fact out of which the 
trust relationship in favor of the plaintiffs arose. They 
read the original Notices of Location recorded April 24, 
1954, which state that the plaintiffs along with the de-
fendant Knop, as locators, claimed the ground covered 
by the locations. err. 21, 22, 52). \Yhile they Inay have 
been misled as to the legal conclusion to be drawn from 
the facts which they knew, it is clear that they are not 
bona fide purchasers for value without notice and they 
took the Faith clailns subject to plaintiffs' interest. 
I-Iendrickson Y. California Talc Co .• supra; Stephens v. 
Colorado, 83 Pac. 381; Soule v. Johnson, supra. It follows 
frorn the foregojng that the cases cited by Appellants in 
their brief reg·arding .a purchaser without notice are not 
in point. 
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That Appellants knew that the vVebsters (plaintiffs) 
claimed an interest in the claims is .attested by the fact 
that they went to great lengths to assure themselves 
that such interest could not be established legally. (Tr. 
24-27, 29, 35-40, 43, 44, 50, 51, 54, 55). It seems to us 
that it was not a question of lack of notice on the part 
of Appellants but rather of f.aulty advice. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the proofs of the foregoing brief were received 
from the printer, the Utah case of Knight v. Flat Top 
.\Iining Co., filed .January 8, 1957, No. 8439, has come 
to the attention of Respondents. That case held that the 
unpatented mining clain1s acquired by relocation of 
prior clai1ns, when the latter were subject to relocation 
for failure to do assessn1ent work, by a co-owner, to the 
exclusion of the other owners, is subject to a trust in 
favor of the excluded owners and their successors in 
interest. The Court quoted, with approval, the general 
rule from Stevens v. Grand Cen,tral Mining Co., supra, 
cited on page 4 of this brief, which is applicable to the 
facts of this case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence of 
record is sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial 
court that the defendant John J. Knop held the title 
acquired by his relocation of the Faith claims on August 
1-t-, 1954, in trust for the plaintiffs, and that the Appel-
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lants, having notice of the s.ame, took the claims subject 
to the interest of the plaintiffs. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the judgment of 
the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADA:NIS, PETERSON & ANDERSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents 
::Monticello, Utah 
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